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Does Dunning’s OLI model really explain the pattern of foreign direct investments by emerging
market multinationals (EMMs)? I argue that it suffers from the basic flaw of assuming that
location advantages (CSAs) are properties of a country and freely available to all firms
operating there. But some CSAs have owners, usually local firms, who can sometimes derive
significant gains from the monopoly control of these resources. They can use this monopoly
power to finance intangible-seeking investments in developed countries to obtain the firm-
specific advantages (FSAs) they lack and, hence. compete with FSA-rich MNEs in their own
market, and then internationally. Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society.
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, multinational firms based in
emerging markets, the BRIC and VISTA countries of
Brazil, Russia, India, China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
South Africa, Turkey, and Argentina, as well as
Mexico and Thailand, have started to invest abroad
in competition with established multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) based in more affluent countries. As
the number of these emerging market multinationals
(EMMs) has risen, a major topic of discussion in
the international business (IB) literature has been
whether these investments represent a new phenom-
enon that requires new theories, or whether they can
be explained within the existing theoretical frame-
works that have been used to explain their affluent
country cousins, the established MNEs.
The OLI model (Dunning, 1988; Dunning and
Lundan, 2008) is the paradigm most IB scholars
have used when trying to make sense of the foreign
investments of EMMs (e.g., Dunning, 2006; Narula,
2006; Rugman and Li, 2007; Lessard and Lucea,
2009; Rugman, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009). Some
authors, for example Rugman and Li (2007), con-
clude that OLI demonstrates that the present foreign
investments of EMMs are ill advised and that sus-
tainable investments will have to wait until EMMs
accumulate real firm-specific advantages (FSAs),
such as cutting-edge technologies and strong brands.
Others (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008;
Ramamurti, 2009; Lessard and Lucea, 2009) argue
that the OLI model must be extended because
EMMs possess unconventional types of FSAs not
considered by the model.
Keywords: emerging market multinationals; MNE theory; OLI;
transaction cost theory; bundling model
*Correspondence to: Jean-François Hennart, Heuvelstraat 14,
5131AP, Alphen, The Netherlands. E-mail: j.f.hennart@uvt.nl
Global Strategy Journal
Global Strat. J., 2: 168–187 (2012)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1111/j.2042-5805.2012.01038.x
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
While acknowledging that some EMMs have
genuine FSAs they can exploit in foreign markets, I
take a more radical view. I argue that the difficulty the
OLI model has in explaining some of the foreign
investments made by EMMs, specifically their
intangible-seeking investments in developed coun-
tries, arises from a basic flaw in the model which, up
to now, has not been generally acknowledged.1 The
OLI model states that firms expand across countries
when the exploitation of their firm-specific advan-
tages in a host country is most efficiently done in
conjunction with host country resource endowments,
such as natural resources, labor, market size, and
institutions. These resources, which Dunning calls
‘the locational advantages of countries’ (Dunning,
1988) and Rugman and Verbeke (1990) call ‘country-
specific advantages’ (CSAs), are assumed to be prop-
erties of countries, available to all firms operating
there (Dunning, 1988). I argue that most CSAs are not
freely available to foreign investors. Many, such as
land, natural resources, labor, and distribution assets,
are sold in imperfect markets, giving their local
owners significant market power. This explains why
some EMMs can compete with MNEs and generate
the profits needed to acquire the FSAs they lack.
Intangible-seeking foreign direct investments by
EMMs can, thus, be understood as ways by which
emerging market firms with preferential access to this
subset of CSAs (which I will call complementary
local resources) acquire abroad the complementary
FSAs they lack to compete with foreign MNEs—first
at home and then internationally.
In the next section, I show why intangible-seeking
foreign direct investments by emerging market firms
fit awkwardly into the OLI model because of its dual
assumption that all foreign investments require the
investing firm to have ownership advantages (FSAs)
and that all CSAs are freely accessible. I show that
most complementary local resources are not freely
available to foreign MNEs. This leads to a bundling
model (Hennart, 2009) where both intangibles
(FSAs) and complementary local resources have
transactional properties. Such a model creates a
space for emerging market firms. I explain why these
firms will seek to acquire intangibles and specify the
conditions under which this search will lead to
foreign direct investments. I then show how the
control of complementary local resources by emerg-
ing market firms can provide them with the profits
needed to finance these foreign direct investments. I
conclude with some suggestions for further research.
CAN OLI ACCOUNT FOR EMMS?
The OLI model attempts to explain ‘the extent and
pattern of value added by MNEs outside their
national boundaries’ (Dunning, 1988: 21). MNEs are
firms that produce goods and services in foreign
countries with their own employees, as opposed to
firms that export to these countries or that license or
franchise producers located there. Dunning lists
three necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of MNEs: firms create value added with
their employees abroad when they have ownership
advantages, location advantages, and internalization
advantages.2
The first condition for a firm undertaking value-
adding activities in a foreign country is that it pos-
sesses ‘ownership advantages’ (Dunning, 1988) or
‘firm-specific advantages’ (FSAs) for Rugman and
Verbeke (1990). FSAs are property rights and intan-
gible asset advantages, for example, new product and
process technologies and strong brand names
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Dunning notes that
having FSAs is not a sufficient condition for owning
value-adding operations abroad because the firm
could exploit its FSA, for example a proprietary
process, by integrating into production at home and
exporting the products made with that process. A
second condition is, therefore, that it is more desirable
to locate production in a foreign country than at
home. For this to be true, a country must offer location
advantages that can persuade a firm to locate produc-
tion there as opposed to at home. Location advantages
(CSAs) consist of a country’s endowment of natural
resources, labor, and pool of customers, as well as
investment incentives and disincentives, tariff and
nontariff barriers, and institutions (Dunning and
Lundan, 2008).
A firm can have FSAs and the target country
CSAs, and yet it may decide not to establish value-
adding activities in that country, preferring to license
or franchise the exploitation of its FSA to a local
firm. Therefore, a third condition for multinational
production must be that it is more efficient for firms
to exploit their FSAs through their own employees
1 But see Hennart (2009) and Ramamurti (2009).
2 This is why Dunning’s model is called the OLI model. It is
also called the eclectic paradigm because it merges internaliza-
tion and location theories.
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than through renting or selling the intangibles to
independent foreign firms: this is what Dunning calls
an ‘internalization advantage.’ Internalization advan-
tages arise from imperfections in the international
market for FSAs.
The OLI model makes an important distinction
between O advantages (FSAs) and L advantages
(CSAs). As their names imply, FSAs are specific to a
firm and CSAs are specific to a country. In other
words, while FSAs are proprietary to firms, CSAs
are properties of a given country (its natural
resources, market size, labor costs, etc.). Dunning
and Lundan (2008: 96) write that CSAs are ‘specific
to a particular location . . . but available to all firms.’
For Lessard and Lucea (2009: 283), CSAs are
‘common to all firms located in a country.’ Rama-
murti (2009: 411–412) lists the CSAs of emerging
countries as consisting of ‘natural resource endow-
ments,’ ‘low cost labor,’ ‘a large and rapidly growing
home market,’ and ‘underdeveloped hard and soft
infrastructure’—advantages and disadvantages that
apply equally to all firms present in the country, both
native and foreign owned.
The OLI model predicts that firms will make
foreign direct investments when they have FSAs.
However, authors looking at EMMs have pointed out
that they do not seem to possess many FSAs.
Rugman (2009: 61) echoes the views of many (e.g.,
Bonaglia, Goldstein, and Mathews, 2007; Mathews,
2002a; Ramamurti, 2009) when he states that ‘there
is little evidence that emerging economy MNEs
have developed sustainable FSAs, especially the
knowledge-based FSAs in systems integration and
internal managerial coordination which are now
important for the success of differentiated networks
Western-type MNEs.’
Faced with this disconnect between the predic-
tions of the OLI model and the empirical evidence
of EMM foreign direct investments, IB scholars
have taken three positions: some have invoked the
OLI model to argue that emerging market firms will
not be able to operate abroad successfully because
they do not possess FSAs; their present foreign
forays are a flash in the pan, ill advised, and con-
demned to be short lived; a second group of
researchers note that the fact that EMMs do not have
FSAs, yet expand abroad, shows that the OLI model
cannot explain EMMs and should be replaced by
theories that apply specifically to EMMs; a third
group argues that emerging market firms may not
have the traditional FSAs, but they do have new
types of FSAs that allow them to expand abroad
and, in particular, to countries at the same or lower
levels of development.
Rugman (2009) belongs to the first group. He
notes that EMMs have not expanded abroad based
on their FSAs, but instead based on their ready
access to CSAs, oil and gas in Russia, minerals in
Brazil, and cheap labor in India and China. These
CSAs cannot provide a long-term basis for multina-
tional activity because they are available to all firms.
Discussing the case of Chinese EMMs, Rugman and
Li (2007: 333) write:
‘Basic theory suggests that multinational enterprises
succeed when they develop knowledge-based capa-
bilities, often called firm-specific advantages (FSAs).
In China’s case its large MNEs have few such knowl-
edge based FSAs. Instead, they are building scale
economies based on China’s country-specific advan-
tages (CSAs) in relatively cheap labor and natural
resources . . . However there need to be more than
economies of scale in the case of China’s MNEs, as
such scale advantages reflect a country factor avail-
able to all firms, rather than being an FSA.’
Lessard and Lucea (2009: 288) reach the same
conclusion based on a slightly different argument:
‘EMNEs [EMMs] that base their international com-
petitive advantage on the basis of privileged access to
natural resources or cheap unskilled labor are, almost
by definition, non-sustainable: natural resources are
finite and wage differentials with more advanced
markets may narrow quickly as emerging markets
develop.’
These authors conclude that because they do not
have strong FSAs and so instead rely on CSAs,
which are available to all firms located in the country
including the subsidiaries of developed country
MNEs, emerging market firms are unlikely to
become multinationals until they acquire the neces-
sary FSAs. Hence, Rugman’s (2009: 53) prediction:
‘When will China generate its own world-class
MNEs? The answer is—not for 10 or 20 years.’
Mathews (2002a, 2002b, 2006a, 2006b) is the
main proponent of the second position. He argues
that Asian EMMs, which he calls Dragon Multina-
tionals, ‘help to expose the weaknesses and limits of
traditional accounts of MNEs and of existing theo-
ries and frameworks of International Business’
(Mathews, 2006a: 8) because, contrary to the predic-
tions of OLI that MNEs venture abroad to exploit
their FSAs, the Dragons have expanded abroad
without such FSAs:
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‘Can we account for the success of these latecomers
from the periphery, as they internationalize, in terms
of a framework that emphasizes their prior resource
wealth and their motivation to expand abroad to
exploit this resource wealth in poorer and less well
endowed markets? The answer is: No, we can’t.
To tackle the case of these latecomers from the
periphery . . . we need a framework that emphasizes
how resource-poor companies can utilize linkage and
leverage to expand their operations . . .’ (Mathews,
2006b: 154).
Mathews proposes such a framework, the LLL
framework, in which the Dragon’s international
expansion is seen as a search for external resources
that can be explained in terms of resource linkage,
leverage, and learning. Mathews’ model of FSA-
poor EMMs making foreign investments to acquire
FSAs has been rightly criticized for having one
crucial flaw: it does not explain how firms that are
going abroad to learn can, at the same time, success-
fully compete with their teachers (Lessard and
Lucea, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009). There must be
more to the story.
The third position is that EMMs do have FSAs,
but these FSAs are somewhat different from those
possessed by established MNEs in the U.S., Europe,
and Japan. Zeng and Williamson (2007) and
Williamson and Zeng (2009a), for example, show
that some emerging market firms have developed
process innovations that allow them to produce
Western-type goods at lower cost and successfully
sell them abroad. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008)
argue that EMMs are better at understanding emerg-
ing market customers and at operating in countries
with poorly developed institutional environments.
These FSAs allow them to successfully compete in
countries that have even less developed institutions
than their own. Ramamurti (2009) and Lessard and
Lucea (2009) take a similar tack, arguing that the
local environment where EMMs operate gives them
initial FSAs, which they reinforce later through their
foreign investments.
While such FSA-exploiting foreign investments
can be explained by OLI theory, two other types of
EMM investment fit awkwardly into an OLI frame-
work that posits that a firm needs intangible-based
FSAs to expand abroad. First, just like developed
country MNEs (Hennart, 2000), EMMs have
invested abroad to acquire natural resources or
components whenever they cannot be efficiently
obtained through spot purchases or long-term con-
tracts. They have also integrated into foreign sales
subsidiaries to support their exports whenever distri-
bution services could not be efficiently obtained by
contract. These investments are not motivated by
the exploitation of intangible-based advantages.3
Second, EMMs have also invested in developed
countries to acquire intangibles, setting up greenfield
research laboratories and acquiring intangible-
intensive firms. This type of investment is also dif-
ficult to reconcile with the OLI model since it is not
motivated by FSA exploitation but by FSA acquisi-
tion.4 It is also unclear how firms without FSAs can
successfully compete with MNEs and invest abroad
at the same time. In this article, I provide a simple
explanation for these intangible-seeking invest-
ments. I argue that, contrary to the assumption of the
OLI model, an important subset of CSAs, comple-
mentary local resources, such as access to local
customers, land, raw materials, labor, and so on, is
not always available on competitive markets. The
control that local firms have over such resources can
provide them with the profits necessary to acquire
intangibles through foreign direct investments. The
likelihood of this scenario is especially high in
emerging markets. To understand EMMs, one needs
a model that does not privilege intangibles over
complementary local resources but instead treats
them in a fully parallel fashion.
THE COSTS OF ACCESSING
COMPLEMENTARY
LOCAL RESOURCES
In the rest of this article, I assume that developed
country MNEs enter foreign countries to serve local
customers. To do this, MNEs need to bundle their
FSAs (cutting-edge technologies, strong brands)
with complementary local resources such as land,
3 To account for these types of investment, Dunning added to
his earlier intangible-based O advantages (asset advantages or
Oa) a new category of O advantages called transactional advan-
tages (or Ot advantages) ‘which arise specifically from the
multinationality of a company’ (Dunning, 1981: 27). This, of
course, is a purely tautological fix since it ends up predicting
that a firm will internalize when there are benefits to internal-
izing. In the rest of the article, I ignore these Ot advantages and
assume that all O advantages (or FSAs) are intangible based.
4 Dunning attempted to handle this problem by including in Ot
or transactional advantages the ‘competencies of the managers
to identify, evaluate, and harness resources and capabilities
from throughout the world’ (Dunning, 2000: 168) (see also
Narula 2012 in this issue). Since these competencies only
become apparent after the firm has become an MNE, this is also
tautological.
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utilities, employees, managers, access to suppliers,
and access to final customers (Hennart, 2009). As
we have seen, the OLI model assumes that these
complementary local resources are sold on competi-
tive markets and available to all firms, local and
MNEs, on an equal footing. My point is that this is
not always the case in developed countries and even
less so in emerging markets.
The OLI model acknowledges the presence of
market imperfections, but these are hypothesized to
apply only to FSAs. Indeed, it is because FSAs
cannot be sold on efficient markets that their owners
must vertically integrate into the target country pro-
duction of goods and services that incorporate these
FSAs. In other words, imperfections cause markets
for FSAs to be internalized within MNEs. This is the
internalization condition of OLI. If FSA owners
could license and franchise their FSAs to local
owners of complementary resources at low transac-
tion costs, they would not have to shoulder the high
costs of integrating into production in a foreign
country and there would be no foreign investment.
Given that OLI assumes that the transfer of FSAs
between MNEs and local owners of complementary
resources is subject to market imperfections,
why shouldn’t markets for complementary local
resources also suffer from imperfections? Figure 1
lists the main complementary local resources that an
MNE must access to exploit its FSAs into a host
country and some of the problems with accessing
them.
To access complementary local resources, one
must know of their existence, location, and charac-
teristics, contract for them, and enforce the transac-
tion. All of these may involve significant costs to
MNEs, and these costs may be particularly high in
emerging markets. As noted in the IB literature,
MNEs entering a country incur information costs
because of their lack of familiarity with local condi-
tions. Take, for example, customer acquisition.
Large market size may be a location advantage
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008) but to take advantage
of it, an MNE must be able to identify customers and
secure their business. This requires understanding
their needs and tastes—a greater challenge for
foreign managers than for local entrepreneurs since
the latter have, at least in part, acquired that skill as
a by-product of being born there. The IB literature is
replete with examples of MNEs failing to understand
the needs of local customers (Ricks, 1983; de Mooij,
2010).5 Lenovo’s crucial strategic move that estab-
lished its dominance in the Chinese PC industry was
to introduce computers with the latest technology
ahead of IBM and other foreign vendors, and at the
same price at which they sold their older technology
(Xie and White, 2004; Sull and Wang, 2008). In
developed countries foreign entrants can rely on
market research companies for reliable data on cus-
tomer tastes and purchase habits (in the case of
business-to-consumer sales) and on public sources
of information to identify potential customers and
how to contact them (in the case of business-to-
business sales). Such information is likely to be dif-
ficult to obtain in emerging markets because of the
lack of independent market research firms and
because much of the information useful for B-to-B
sales is private information shared within local net-
works from which foreigners are excluded (Li, Park,
and Li, 2004).
Assuming that foreign entrants have successfully
identified the resources they need and who controls
them, they have to negotiate access. Access to
resources is easier if there is a competitive market for
the services of these resources or for the firms in
which these resources are embedded, since competi-
tive markets reduce bargaining costs, reveal informa-
tion, and protect against holdup (Hennart, 1982). In
5 One potential solution is for MNEs to use local managers, but
these managers may experience difficulties persuading head-
quarters to make the necessary marketing mix adaptations (Bir-
kinshaw and Ridderstrale, 1999) as this only shifts the cultural
divide from the subsidiary level (expatriate manager versus
locals) to the headquarters level (local subsidiary manager
versus the corporate staff).
Market imperfectionsTasks
Knowledge of resources Poor public information; network outsidership
Bargaining for resources
Utilities Ex ante and ex post monopoly
Land Government monopoly
Natural resources Government monopoly
Labor Union monopoly
Customer access Ex post monopoly; network outsidership
Enforcement No or inefficient rule-based system; network 
outsidership
Figure 1. Imperfections in the
markets for complementary local
resources in emerging markets
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contrast to the assumption of OLI, the market for
many complementary local resources is often
monopolistic, exposing MNEs to holdup. In coun-
tries that have adopted Roman law, the State claims
ownership of subsoil resources and has a monopoly
of mineral deposits. In some countries, government
authorities have title to all of a country’s land. In
most countries, they enjoy a monopoly in the provi-
sion and sale of products and services that range
from public defense, health, and transportation ser-
vices to tobacco and alcoholic beverages and are the
sole buyer of the inputs needed for their supply: they
often use this monopoly power to benefit local firms
to the detriment of foreigners (Hennart, 1982;
Zaheer, 1995). Economies of scale in the provision
of utilities often lead to local monopolies. The like-
lihood of a competitive market for complementary
local resources is smaller in emerging markets due to
the greater role played by governments there.
Relying on monopolistic suppliers or customers is
particularly dangerous for MNEs that have to make
specific investments. MNEs exploiting mineral
deposits under license from a host state often have to
make immobile investments that grow in size as
exploitation proceeds. This makes it possible for the
State to hold them up, a phenomenon Vernon (1971)
has called the obsolescing bargain. The inability of
foreign mining firms to have clear title to a crucial
complementary local resource (the mineral deposit)
they need to exploit their FSA (typically their supe-
rior technology and project management skills)
makes such investments very risky.
A similar situation occurs in distribution and
explains why MNEs are sometimes unable to line up
independent distributors. When consumers require
significant help in choosing or using products and in
having them demonstrated and repaired, local dis-
tributors may have to make significant intellectual
investments in getting to know customers and prod-
ucts and substantial physical ones in repair facilities,
spare parts, and so forth. Distributors will hesitate to
make such investments if they are manufacturer-
specific, that is if their value is much lower when
used in conjunction with manufacturers other than
the present one (for example, because the product
has no close substitutes or uses a proprietary tech-
nology). In that case, distributors would incur losses
if they were to stop working with their present manu-
facturers and they are, therefore, vulnerable to being
held up by them. To protect themselves, distributors
will ask manufacturers to promise to keep doing
business with them for a specified length of time and
under specified conditions, for example by signing a
long-term exclusive distribution contract. Without
such assurances, distributors may refuse to make the
necessary investments and manufacturers will have
to arrange their own distribution (Williamson, 1985).
Consequently, when distribution requires highly spe-
cific human or capital assets, distributors will be
either tied to manufacturers by contract or owned by
them. This means that MNEs entering a foreign
market and eager to line up distribution will often
find that there is no market for it, as the best distri-
bution assets are already owned by local manufac-
turers or are contractually tied to them.
Alternative solutions then are either to build a
distribution system from scratch, if allowed, or to
acquire local firms that own the needed distribution
assets. Here, again, foreign entrants may experience
difficulties, as governments and the public often
object to acquisitions of domestic firms by foreign-
ers. The situation is worse in emerging markets
because the number of potential acquisition targets is
smaller given the prevalence of government and
semipublic firms and firms tied to business groups
(Khanna and Yafey, 2007). Because of inefficient
domestic markets, emerging market firms also tend
to be more vertically integrated. For example, the
Weiqiao Group, the largest textile company in
China, grows its own cotton, from which it makes
yarn that it dyes and weaves into textiles. It has its
own electricity plant to power its operations and
refines aluminum to use the excess electricity. As
Fan et al. (2007: 5) note, ‘Weiqiao exemplifies a
degree of vertical integration that is a commonplace
Chinese phenomenon.’ Similarly, Mexico’s Grupo
Elektra has integrated vertically into banking to
facilitate its appliance sales (Bhattacharya and
Michael, 2008). The greater degree of vertical inte-
gration makes emerging market firms more costly to
acquire because the acquirer has to incur the cost of
getting rid of the unwanted parts.
Holdup problems can potentially be alleviated by
signing contracts or selecting honest partners.
Foreign entrants may, however, experience high
costs in enforcing trades because they have difficulty
finding good partners, may not understand local laws
and regulations, and are sometimes victims of dis-
crimination by government agencies and courts.
These problems are more severe in emerging than in
developed markets because third party enforcement
is less efficient there (courts, if they exist, may be
slow and corrupt); independent credit bureaus are
not available to check credit risk; and that risk cannot
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be shifted to banks through factoring (Khanna and
Palepu, 2010). Because they are outsiders, foreign
entrants cannot benefit from the enforcement prop-
erties of the closed networks that are common in
such countries (Yang, 2002).
In short, one should not assume that access to all
complementary local resources is always available to
MNEs on efficient markets. In the next sections, I
investigate how this fact helps explain the type of
foreign direct investments undertaken by EMMs and
why EMMs are in a position to make them.
THE BUNDLING MODEL OF FOREIGN
MARKET ENTRY AND EXPANSION
What happens when we drop the OLI assumption
that MNEs can access all complementary local
resources on efficient markets? Figure 2 presents
Hennart’s (2009) bundling model, which sets out the
optimal way in which an MNE seeking to exploit its
intangibles in the target market by selling to local
customers, on the one hand, and local owners of
complementary local resources in the host country,
on the other, combine these assets to provide
products to customers in a host country. The model
determines which party will own equity. Since
equity determines footprint, it also predicts the rela-
tive footprint of MNEs and local firms in the target
market, that is whether MNEs will operate with fully
or partly owned affiliates, or will not have affiliates
there at all, in which case economic activity will be
the exclusive purview of local firms. The model
differs from OLI insofar as it assumes that comple-
mentary local resources have transactional proper-
ties just like the FSAs that the MNE wants to exploit
in the target market. The columns give the transac-
tional characteristics of the intangibles the foreign
investor wants to exploit, while the rows give the
level of market transaction costs incurred in the
transfer of complementary local resources to owners
of intangibles. For simplicity, I assume that knowl-
edge is the intangible asset the foreign entrant wants
to exploit in the target market and that its transfer to
the owner of complementary local resources can
either incur (1) low transaction costs because it is
sold on relatively efficient markets or is available for
free or (2) high transaction costs. Note that whether
the transfer of knowledge entails low or high trans-
action costs is a different issue than its appropriabil-
ity by its owner: knowledge incurs low market
transaction costs when it is easy to license and easy
to steal. I will deal with appropriability later. Assume
also that there is only one complementary local
resource, access to local customers, which can be
had at either high or low transaction costs.
Cell 3 of Figure 2 corresponds to the traditional
foreign direct investment case featured in the OLI
model where an MNE enters the host country and
operates there with a wholly owned affiliate, either a
fully owned greenfield or a full acquisition. Figure 2
shows that this will occur in a very specific set of
circumstances, that is when (1) local firms with
privileged access to local customers incur high trans-
action costs in accessing the MNE’s knowledge and
(2) MNEs incur low transaction costs in accessing
host country customers. Local firms will incur high
transaction costs in accessing the MNE’s knowledge
when such knowledge is tacit and cannot be pat-
ented, yet cannot be appropriated through copying,
and when it is very difficult or impossible to acquire
the firm in which it is embedded. The cost to the










1. Indeterminate 3. MNE has full 
equity = wholly 




2. Local firm has 
full equity = wholly 
owned operations of 
local firm
4. Joint venture 
between MNE and 
local firm
Adapted from Hennart (2009).
Figure 2. Optimal mode of foreign
operation
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foreign firm of accessing local customers will be low
if there is an efficient market for the inputs necessary
to build a distribution network (market researchers
and salespeople), or for the services of market
researchers and distributors, or for the firms per-
forming this task.6 When local firms incur high cost
in accessing the knowledge held by the MNE, while
the MNE can efficiently access distribution, i.e., cell
3, the most efficient arrangement is to have the MNE
take full equity through a wholly owned greenfield
subsidiary or a full acquisition and build up its own
distribution or contract with local firms for distribu-
tion services. This is because this arrangement mini-
mizes the sum of the transfer costs incurred by both
parties. The party who holds equity, i.e., who is paid
for his/her efforts by receiving what is left after all
cooperating parties have received a fixed payment,
does not have to be monitored because that party
captures the full benefit or bears the full cost of
shirking. A party remunerated through a fixed
payment has an incentive to cheat if his/her output is
difficult to measure. Giving equity to the party
whose performance is the hardest to measure, in this
case the MNE, is the most efficient solution because
it minimizes the sum of shirking by the MNE plus
cheating by the local distributor and, thus, maxi-
mizes the rents from bundling these assets (Hennart,
2009).
In cell 2, the transfer of knowledge to the local
distributor incurs low market transaction costs, but
not that of distribution services to the MNE. The
transaction costs of transferring knowledge to the
distributor are low when knowledge is well protected
by property rights and, hence, can be sold or rented
on efficient markets (it has high appropriability) or
when it can be easily copied (i.e. it has low appro-
priability). Knowledge has strong property rights
when it can be embedded in: (1) machines or parts
sold on the market for products; (2) patents and
trademarks that can be efficiently licensed or fran-
chised; (3) individuals who can sell their labor on the
market for labor services; and/or (4) firms that can be
efficiently purchased on the market for firms. When
knowledge transfer incurs low transaction costs but
access to distribution incurs high transaction costs, it
is efficient to give equity to the party with the harder-
to-transfer assets, i.e., to the firm that controls cus-
tomer access. This will minimize total transfer costs.
Hence, the optimal solution will be one where the
local distributor acquires knowledge by copying it,
developing it internally, or purchasing it on various
international markets.
When the transfer of both knowledge and distri-
bution incurs high transaction costs, it makes sense
to give equity rights to both their owners. In that
case, a knowledge owner who is given the right to
equity would find it costly to monitor a distributor
paid a fixed amount ex ante, and vice versa. Instead,
it is efficient to have both parties self-monitor by
giving each an equity claim. This is the typical
market-entry equity joint venture with the MNE con-
tributing its intangibles, typically tacit technological
knowledge, and the host country firm contributing
complementary local assets, typically local market
knowledge and access to distribution and to political
actors (Hennart, 1988).
This bundling model differs fundamentally from
the traditional bargaining model in the political risk
literature (e.g., Fagre and Wells, 1982). That litera-
ture argues that MNEs bargain with host country
governments to be able to get full ownership of their
foreign subsidiaries, suggesting that MNEs have a
preference for equity. The bundling model argues
instead that the optimal solution is to give equity to
the party with the most difficult-to-sell inputs. A firm
with difficult-to-sell intangibles will, thus, have
to integrate into local production when the cost
of transferring its intangibles to a local owner of
complementary resources is higher than the cost of
transferring the complementary local resources to
the innovator. A firm that has developed intangibles
may, however, be better off selling its intangibles to
owners of complementary local resources in the
main consumer countries if its intangibles can be
sold on efficient markets while complementary
resources are costly to acquire. For example, it is
efficient for an innovating firm based in a small
economy with a limited market for the products in
which its inventions are embedded to sell itself to a
foreign firm with established distribution networks
if international equity markets are more efficient
6 As the previous example shows, it is important to keep in mind
that the bundling of intangibles and complementary resources
can potentially take place in three different markets—the
market for assets, the market for the services of assets, and the
market for firms in which the assets are embedded—and that
these three markets are potential substitutes (Hennart, 2009).
For example, knowledge can be embedded in intellectual or
physical assets, a patent or a machine, which can be sold in the
market for assets; in patents which can be rented in the market
for licenses; and in firms which can be acquired on equity
markets. Likewise, an MNE that needs to access local custom-
ers can contract for the services of distributors, hire salespeople,
or buy on equity markets distribution companies or manufac-
turing firms with distribution networks.
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than the markets for the foreign complementary
assets necessary to distribute its products in foreign
countries.7
The bundling model has a number of important
implications for the theory of the MNE and for EMMs
in particular. First, it makes clear that the OLI model,
being based on the peculiar assumption that comple-
mentary local resources are always available on
competitive host country markets (i.e., that they are
always in the top row of Figure 2), gives a limited
view of the interaction between foreign and host
country firms. OLI focuses on the columns of
Figure 2, but neglects the rows. This neglect of the
rows also characterizes the extant theory of the MNE
which explains why firms own operations abroad by
looking only at the level of transaction costs in the
international market for knowledge (e.g., Arora and
Fosfuri, 2000; Davidson and McFetridge, 1984;
Rugman, 1981). In this MNE-centric view, the choice
between fully owned MNE affiliates and joint ven-
tures with local firms depends solely on the MNE’s
level of commitment to the foreign market (Anderson
and Gatignon, 1986; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).
Figure 2 shows that we also need to take into consid-
eration the transactional properties of complementary
local resources because when they are difficult to
transfer to FSA owners, the optimal configuration
will be one where local owners of complementary
local resources will either keep full equity and obtain
the complementary intangibles on global markets
(cell 2) or share equity with their owners and obtain
access through joint ventures in the host country
(cell 4).
Figure 2 shows that the survival and profitability
of MNE subsidiaries in emerging markets hinges
on their ability to access complementary local
resources, while that of emerging market firms
depends on their ability to efficiently and cheaply
access intangibles. At this point, two questions
remain unanswered: first, when will the local firm’s
quest for intangibles result in foreign direct invest-
ments? Second, if local firms need to access intan-
gibles, how do they manage to do it while




We have seen that in some cases foreign entrants will
find that access to complementary local resources
entails high costs and that it will then be optimal for
both parties to give local firms full or partial equity
claims. There are then two possibilities, depending
on the transactional structure of intangibles: if intan-
gibles have high transfer costs, their owners will
combine their assets in a joint venture in the host
market (cell 4); if intangibles have low transfer costs,
emerging market firms will either appropriate them
at no cost or purchase them on efficient international
markets and will keep the whole equity (cell 2). In
this latter case, the transfer of intangibles from
developed country firms to emerging market firms
will take place in the markets for assets, services of
assets, or firms incorporating the assets and will be
optimal for both parties.
When will that transfer lead to foreign direct
investment and, hence, to the emergence of EMMs?
A multinational firm is a firm that has employees
abroad. Hence, we need to investigate the specific
circumstances under which an owner of complemen-
tary local assets will acquire intangibles by having
employees in foreign locations. To keep things
simple, I continue to omit reputation and focus on
knowledge.
Figure 3 shows the many ways in which knowl-
edge can be acquired. It indicates that knowledge-
seeking foreign direct investment will be used when
two conditions are simultaneously met: (1) knowl-
edge is most efficiently acquired through employ-
ment contracts and (2) employees are located
abroad.
Knowledge is often mobile and its acquisition
does not require a foreign presence. First, home
country returnees may bring back knowledge
acquired abroad (The Economist, 2011a). A signifi-
cant amount of business and technical knowledge is
not protected by patents and can be accessed free of
charge from a foreign location. Foreign products can
be copied through reverse engineering. Technology
necessary to manufacture a product is sometimes
fully embedded in machines that can be purchased
from foreign sellers, who will typically train buyers
in their use (Mathews, 2002a). Knowledge is also
embedded in parts and components and by buying
components, assemblers of modularized products
such as PCs and mobile phones can access up-to-
date technology and incorporate it into products sold
7 Aharoni (2009: 379) bemoans the fact that many high-tech
Israeli companies sell themselves to large U.S. firms rather than
follow ‘the torturous road leading to becoming a large MNE
themselves,’ but this is what the bundling model predicts is the
most efficient solution for both group of firms, although not
necessarily for the home country.
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to final users. Technology services are also mobile:
some types of knowledge, such as formulae for
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are embedded in
patents, which can sometimes be efficiently accessed
through licensing contracts (Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella, 2001; Hennart, 1982; Levin et al.,
1987; Teece, 1986). Knowledge embedded in
foreign patents is sometimes explicit enough—and
patent enforcement in emerging markets weak
enough—that it can be obtained by reading them.
Tacit knowledge embedded in firms can also be
accessed across borders through technical assistance
agreements. Much of the technology in the chemical
and petroleum industries is held by specialist firms
that sell their services on the open market (Arora and
Gambardella, 1998). Foreign professionals and pro-
fessional service firms can also be tapped for mana-
gerial and marketing advice, while tacit marketing
knowledge can be acquired through OEM contracts
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005). These forms of tech-
nology acquisition do not result in foreign direct
investment and, hence, do not make their acquirer a
multinational firm.
For access to knowledge to result in a foreign
direct investment, there must be an extension of
the firm abroad (an employment relationship) and
employees must be located in a foreign country.8 It
makes sense to employ workers in foreign locations
(cell 5 in Figure 3) when their productivity is higher
there than in a home location. One reason might be
the availability of knowledge spillovers. Local
owners of complementary resources may access
foreign knowledge by buying firms located in a
technology-rich country or by setting up a greenfield
subsidiary in that foreign country. Buying full or
partial equity in existing firms will be preferred to
other modes of knowledge acquisition when one
needs a complete set of capabilities (Deng, 2007;
Rui and Yip, 2008) and when the desired parts of the
acquired firm can be separated from the unwanted
ones, i.e., if the potential target is digestible (Hennart
and Reddy, 1997). Many developed countries have
efficient equity markets where firms can be bought.
Firms in these countries are often specialized or, if
diversified, divisionalized, making it relatively easy
to buy only the desired part or to sell off the
unwanted parts post-acquisition. Hence, Huawei,
after it had obtained a dominant position in the
Chinese domestic market, acquired expertise in
optical network technologies through its acquisition
of a small high-tech U.S. firm, OptiMight (Zeng and
Williamson, 2007). Suzlon gained knowledge on the
manufacturing of wind turbines gearboxes and drive
trains through the acquisition of the Belgian firm
Hansen Transmission International (Awate, Larsen,
and Mudambi, 2012). Local owners of complemen-
tary resources in search of complementary knowl-
edge may also set up greenfield R&D subsidiaries in
foreign locations where experienced personnel can
be hired. Haier, for example, has established an
R&D subsidiary close to Ericsson’s headquarters in
8 Employment relationships do not necessarily result in foreign
direct investment since employees are sometimes mobile and
foreign employees can be hired to work at the headquarters of
emerging market firms.
Knowledge is embedded in
































Figure 3. Modes of technology
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Stockholm to tap the talent available there (Zeng and
Williamson, 2007). So just as the possession of
intangibles by MNEs does not necessarily lead to
foreign direct investment because some of the intan-
gibles can be exploited by licensing or franchising
local firms or can be appropriated for free by them, it
is only in specific circumstances that the search for
technology by local owners of complementary
resources will result in foreign direct investments.
We can now return to the difference between cell
2 and cell 4 of Figure 2. Cell 2 corresponds to the
case where access to intangibles incurs low trans-
action costs and cell 4 where it entails high trans-
action costs. This could be because knowledge is
embedded in firms, but the cost of acquiring them
is high, because (1) the governments of the coun-
tries where the firms are located block acquisitions
by emerging market firms; (2) the acquisition target
is difficult to digest because the knowledge that is
sought by the purchaser is tightly linked to other
unneeded assets (Hennart, 2009); or (3) the emerg-
ing market firm may lack the resources and the
management skills to carry out foreign acquisitions
or foreign greenfield investments. In those cases,
the most efficient solution will be an equity joint
venture where the emerging market firm brings
access to complementary local assets, such as dis-
tribution or natural resources, while the foreign
firm contributes its proprietary knowledge. These
equity joint ventures will be located in emerging






The idea that EMMs make foreign investments to
source intangibles is by now well established (e.g.,
Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007; Rui and
Yip, 2008). What remains a puzzle is how EMMs,
which most observers agree did not start with
cutting-edge FSAs and which are often fiercely com-
peting with FSA-rich MNEs in their home market,
can marshal the resources necessary to acquire the
FSAs they need.
The answer is that some emerging market firms
obtain these resources from their control of comple-
mentary local resources. Emerging market firms are
sometimes in a position to directly barter market
access for technology. Their bargaining power also
allows them to capture the bulk of the profits earned
from putting together the local resources-intangibles
bundle, and these profits can then be used to pur-
chase the intangibles needed to catch up.
To make that point, I first introduce a simple
model that predicts the relative bargaining power of
local owners of complementary local resources
versus foreign owners of intangibles. I argue that
relative bargaining power determines the share of the
rents earned from their joint contribution (what I will
call the bundle). I then explain why some emerging
market owners of complementary local resources
enjoy some measure of market power and why, in
contrast, the bargaining power of technology sellers
is often overestimated.
In Figure 2, I have shown which party, the MNE
or the local owner of complementary resources,
should own the equity. If it is optimal to vest equity
in the MNE, that firm will extend its footprint by
setting up wholly or partly owned affiliates in the
host country. If, however, it is optimal to give equity
to the local firm, that firm may, in some cases, extend
its footprint abroad by acquiring foreign firms or
setting up foreign greenfield subsidiaries. Figure 2,
however, does not tell us how the gains of putting
together the local assets-foreign assets bundle will
be shared between the MNE and the local firm. For
example, cell 2, where owners of local complemen-
tary resources have full equity, covers two very dif-
ferent situations: (1) one where these owners can
obtain the foreign firm’s intangible for free by
copying it and, hence, capture all of the gains of the
bundle; and (2) another where owners of intangibles
can sell them on efficient markets, for example
through the sale of machinery or components that
are difficult to imitate. If the machinery or the com-
ponent has few substitutes, its manufacturer will
capture most of the value of the bundle. For example,
a significant part of the total value of a laptop is
captured by Intel and Microsoft because these two
firms have strong bargaining power vis-a-vis laptop
assemblers: Intel’s chips are difficult to duplicate
and can be sold to laptop assemblers on efficient
markets, while Microsoft has effectively locked out
competition from other software providers through
first-mover advantages. Yet those two firms have no
equity in laptop assembly plants. The market for
laptop assembly (but not its distribution) is competi-
tive, yielding what Stan Shih of Acer has called the
smiling curve of profitability in the PC industry. As
these examples show, the apportionment of equity
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has no direct influence on the distribution of the
gains from the intangible-complementary local
resources bundle, which depends on the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties.
Figure 4, adapted from Ceccagnoli and Rother-
mael (2008), shows how the division of the rents
from the local assets-technology bundle between
consumers, local owners of complementary assets,
and intangible owners depends on the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties. Here again I focus on
technology to keep things simple. The columns indi-
cate the bargaining power of the technology owner.
That bargaining power is high when the technology
has few substitutes. This, in turn, hinges on the
height of the barriers to imitation. They are high
when intellectual property laws create a legal
monopoly for the technology owner or when the
characteristics of the technology make it costly for
others to duplicate the product in which it is embed-
ded. The rows describe the bargaining power of the
local owner of complementary resources. Cell 3 in
Figure 4 corresponds to the case where technology
owners have strong bargaining power while owners
of complementary local resources have weak
bargaining power because these complementary
resources are supplied on competitive markets. Then
technology sellers capture most of the rents created
by the bundle. But as Figure 4 shows, this is only one
of four possible cases. If technology owners have
weak bargaining power because technology is easy
to copy or because it is sold on competitive markets,
while the supply of complementary local resources
is monopolized by a single owner, that owner will
capture most of the value of the bundle (cell 2). This
is the case, for instance, when a host country firm
controls access to rare and valuable resources such
as customers. When both the owners of technology
and of complementary local resources have strong
bargaining power, they will more equally share the
gains from the bundle (cell 4).
The outcome of this bargaining game should vary
across industries and countries. I argue in the next
sections that there are many reasons to believe that in
emerging markets the bargaining power of owners of
complementary local resources will be higher, and
that of technology owners lower, than in developed
markets. Local firms in emerging markets may,
therefore, often be able to capture most of the rents
from the bundle, giving them the wherewithal to
acquire the technology they need through foreign
direct investment and other means.
Knowledge resources in emerging markets
There are many reasons to believe that the bargain-
ing power of owners of knowledge is weaker than
generally thought. The task facing emerging market
owners of complementary local resources is to match
the technology of their MNE competitors. As Awate
et al. (2012) persuasively show, catching up does not
require the broad and deep knowledge base that is
needed to innovate. Imitators do not have to endure
the costly trial and error process of innovators and
can directly opt for proven technologies. They can
more readily leapfrog to new technologies because,
unlike their established rivals, they do not have sunk
investments in old technologies. Mittal Steel, then
called Ispat, was able to purchase from specialist
suppliers plants using the direct reduced iron
technique, a cutting-edge and cost effective steel
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technology that incumbent firms had been slow to
adopt because it was incompatible with the plants
they already had (Mathews, 2002a). Unencumbered
with preconceived ideas and not having to worry
about cannibalizing existing sales, emerging market
firms often come up with products that are more cost
effective than those of their MNE competitors
(Williamson and Zeng, 2009b).
As argued earlier, the bargaining power of knowl-
edge owners vis-a-vis that of owners of complemen-
tary local resources depends on the number of
feasible suppliers of similar technology. The larger
that number, the lower their bargaining power.
Hence, that bargaining power is high if intellectual
property laws give technology owners a monopoly in
its use and low if owners of complementary local
resources can easily infringe on patents and dupli-
cate products without penalty. Even in developed
economies, a significant part of the knowledge used
by established MNEs, such as their business models,
is not patentable and can be freely imitated. A
number of entrepreneurs in China and India are
returnees who have taken back with them their
knowledge of Western business practices and tech-
nology (The Economist, 2011a). Robin Li and Eric
Xu, the two founders of Baidu, China’s leading
search engine, and both returnees from the U.S.,
established Baidu’s dominance by quickly copying
the pay-for-performance advertising model pio-
neered by Overture, a U.S. company (Chen and Wu,
2009). Most emerging markets have weak regimes of
intellectual property protection that make it possible
for domestic firms to copy patents and reverse engi-
neer products. This is the way Indian pharmaceutical
firms and Chinese carmakers got established (Indu,
2005; The Economist, 2007; Feng, 2010).9
There is also a general consensus among observ-
ers that markets for technology are becoming more
competitive, lowering the bargaining power of tech-
nology developers (Arora et al., 2001; Williamson
and Zeng, 2009b). Williamson and Zeng (2009b)
point out that knowledge is becoming more codified
and digitized, making its acquisition easier. Cutting-
edge technology can be bought from specialist firms
on the open market (Arora et al., 2001). Interna-
tional experts and professional service firms
compete to sell best practice in management, mar-
keting, branding, logistics, accounting, and finance.
Pearl River Piano, the Chinese firm that is the
world’s largest piano maker, learned how to improve
the quality of their pianos by hiring ‘. . . more than
10 world-class consultants to assist in improving
every aspect of piano making, from design to pro-
duction to final finish’ (Zeng and Williamson, 2007:
52). Huawei, a major Chinese seller of telecommu-
nication equipment, has contracted with IBM, the
Hay Group, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers to help
improve its management practices (Luo et al., 2011).
The rapid growth and improved living conditions of
their economies are also allowing emerging market
firms to hire and retain foreign employees and attract
back their own nationals whose education and train-
ing has been subsidized by developed countries
(Williamson and Zeng, 2009b).10
The modularization of the value chains of some
industries is also facilitating technological catch-up
(Zeng and Williamson, 2007). In computers and
mobile phone handsets, for example, the final
product is made up of components that fit together
because all industry participants have agreed on a
common interface. This means that an entrant does
not need to master the technology of the whole
system, but may specialize in only one component.
As a result, there are generally many possible sup-
pliers of a given component, and the latest technol-
ogy can be obtained by emerging market firms by
purchasing components and manufacturing equip-
ment on competitive markets, allowing EMMs like
Lenovo to incorporate the latest technology in their
products at the same time as their MNE rivals (Xie
and White, 2004; Luo, Sun, and Wang, 2011).
While all these modes of technology acquisition
make it possible to acquire different types of capa-
bilities and integrate them with the firm’s existing
ones, the acquisition of going firms offers the added
plus of providing a complete set of technological,
managerial, and marketing capabilities (Hennart,
2009; Rui and Yip, 2008). Acquiring knowledge
through M&As is easier in developed markets than
in emerging ones because the market for corporate
control is relatively more open in developed coun-
tries, making even hostile acquisitions possible.
9 The copy of Daewoo’s Matiz by the Chinese automaker Chery
is so good that apparently the doors and the hood of the QQ fit
the Matiz.
10 In 1999, 20 of the 85 member of Rambaxy’s new drug devel-
opment team were Indian expatriates (Verbeke, 2009). All of
Tata Consulting Service’s top managers have studied and
worked abroad (The Economist, 2011a). As Narula (2012)
points out, the success of Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar Airways
shows that the technical, managerial, and organizational skills
necessary to run airline companies can be acquired through the
wholesale hiring of expatriate staff.
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Firms in developed countries also tend to be more
specialized, making it possible to acquire specific
technological expertise. For example, China’s SGSB
Group, through its acquisition of German-based
Duerkopp Adler, the world’s third-largest industrial
sewing machine company, was able to obtain
cutting-edge technology, marketing experience, and
a valued brand (Zeng and Williamson, 2007).
Because large firms in developed markets are orga-
nized in divisions, EMMs can acquire the part of the
firm they need without having to acquire all of it.
Lenovo was able to purchase IBM’s laptop division
and its R&D center without having to buy all of
IBM, and Grupo Bimbo could buy the North Ameri-
can Fresh Bakery unit of Sara Lee without having to
buy Sara Lee’s other U.S. businesses.
In short, weak intellectual property protection in
emerging markets as well as greater competition in
the supply of technology has significantly reduced
the bargaining power of technology developers.
Even if they have few competitors and hence some
bargaining power in the market for technology ser-
vices, the relative efficiency of the market for corpo-
rate control in developed countries gives technology
buyers the option of purchasing them.
Complementary local resources in
emerging markets
Owners of complementary local resources have high
bargaining power when what they control has few
alternatives. As we have seen, governments in most
emerging markets own title to natural resources, and
they have the monopoly of their sale. Many of them
have used this power to build up national monopo-
lists at the processing stage. The Brazilian govern-
ment, for example, has given its national champion
Vale the monopoly of Brazil’s high-grade iron ore
deposits and helped it become the sole exporter of
Brazilian iron ore (Khanna, Musacchio, and Reisen
de Pinho, 2010). Emerging market governments are
often the sole suppliers of many goods and services
and the sole buyers of the inputs required for their
supply. This gives them strong bargaining power.
Governments in many emerging markets used pro-
tectionist policies to keep foreign firms out until the
1980s and 1990s (Ramamurti, 2009), with some of
these restrictions being lifted only recently—China,
for example, did not fully lift its restrictions on
foreign ownership of distribution until 2004. This has
allowed local firms to gain first-mover advantages
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). By offering
products more responsive to local tastes than those of
their MNE competitors, as well as better service,
some local firms like Haier and Lenovo have used that
breathing space to gain customer loyalty and, hence,
market power. In rural areas, Haier, China’s largest
manufacturer of white goods, is selling washing
machines that can clean vegetables, and in Shanghai
and other big cities where space is at a premium a line
of small-sized machines that can wash a single
change of clothes (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). Haier
has also established its own service organization:
customers can call a toll-free hotline with their
service requests and within 24 hours they can expect
a uniformed repairman to show up at their door with
the necessary parts and tools. This high level of
service has allowed Haier to differentiate itself from
the competition and to charge prices that are even
higher than those charged by some of its foreign
competitors (Hexter and Woetzel, 2007).
Emerging market firms have also gained market
power (and, hence, bargaining power vis-a-vis tech-
nology suppliers) through their preemption of scarce
distribution assets. Grupo Bimbo, the world’s largest
bread maker (McKinsey Quarterly, 2011), estab-
lished a dominant position in its Mexican home
market through its extensive captive distribution
system that delivers fresh bread daily to its custom-
ers (Ager, 1998).11 This control of distribution has
protected the firm against attacks by large MNEs
such as Pepsi (Dawar and Frost, 1999). Haier set up
distribution channels and after sales services to cover
the whole of China while its foreign competitors
typically targeted the east coast’s large cities
(Khanna and Palepu, 2006). It also built a captive
logistics network that has allowed it to sell in the
hinterland, an area closed to its foreign competitors
because no independent distributors were available
there. Likewise, most observers agree that Lenovo’s
control of distribution and superior knowledge of
Chinese consumers and their changing tastes have
allowed the company to successfully compete
against its established rivals; and its first-mover
advantage in setting up what is the largest and most
efficient dealer network in the IT industry in China is
hard to counter. Xie and White (2004: 418) note that
‘Lenovo accumulated customer knowledge and
created a distribution network that has proven nearly
impossible for foreign and even most domestic
11 In the late 1990s, Bimbo was using 14,000 trucks to make
420,000 daily deliveries to 350,000 clients (Ager, 1998).
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competitors to replicate. It has continued with this
strategy as it has extended its capabilities into manu-
facturing and R&D.’ Chen et al. (2001: 5) add that
‘[Lenovo] has emerged as the dominant player in the
Chinese PC market because of its huge distribution
network. This network helped the company compete
successfully against MNCs as well as local compa-
nies.’
One convenient way for MNEs to counter these
first-mover advantages is to acquire the emerging
market firms that own scarce distribution assets and
have strong ties to customers. This option, however,
is often hard to carry out in emerging countries.
Government authorities in emerging markets often
put restrictions on acquisitions of domestic firms by
foreigners. As discussed earlier, the prevalence of
government-owned firms and of firms linked to
industrial groups reduces the number of potential
targets, while the high level of diversification by
emerging market firms is making their integration
more difficult.
To sum up, the evidence shows that while suppli-
ers of technology are operating in an increasingly
competitive environment, many suppliers of comple-
mentary local services in emerging markets enjoy a
monopoly in the supply of these services and hence
are in strong bargaining positions vis-a-vis MNEs.
They have used this strong position to (1) barter
market access for technology within emerging-
market-based alliances and joint ventures and (2)
obtain a large share of the profits derived from the
bundling of complementary local resources and
technology and use these profits to finance in-house
R&D and foreign direct investments.
Some emerging market firms have enlisted the
help of their government to directly barter comple-
mentary local resources for technology within
domestic alliances and joint ventures. According to
Yu Weixang, the director of the Research Institute on
International Trade and Cooperation of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Economics and Trade, this
policy has been applied to more than 80 percent of
all direct foreign investments in China since 1987
(Mu and Lee, 2005). Mu and Lee (2005) describe
how the Chinese government successfully persuaded
the Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company to enter
into a joint venture with Chinese firms and share its
telephone switching technology in exchange for
market access. Once the technology had diffused to
Datang, ZTE, and Huawei, it gave the bulk of state
infrastructure contracts to these firms, helping them
establish themselves as global players. Similarly, the
prospects of selling equipment for the Chinese gov-
ernment’s ambitious plan to build a 9,700-kilometer
bullet train network by 2020 persuaded Alstom and
Kawasaki to locate production facilities in China and
help develop a local train components industry
there.12 Kawasaki helped China South Locomotive
and Rolling Stock Industry (CSR) manufacture train
sets in China, taking CSR engineers to Japan for
training and providing additional technology to
increase speed. The factory now produces about 200
train sets a year. The transfer of knowledge to
Chinese firms has been so effective that Chinese
companies are now building high-speed lines in
Venezuela and Turkey and are bidding against their
former teachers for Brazilian contracts (Shirouzu,
2010).
We would also expect emerging market owners of
complementary local resources with strong bargain-
ing power to be able to capture the bulk of the profits
that accrue from bundling imported intangibles with
complementary local resources. In the international
petroleum industry, where deposits are owned by
governments (or granted by them to the national oil
company), crude oil production-sharing agreements
end up allocating around three-fourths of the profits
to the owners of the deposits (Bindemann, 1999).
This has given these national oil companies consid-
erable resources to undertake foreign investments.
Likewise, emerging market firms that are in a strong
bargaining position have obtained the financial
resources needed to finance their technological catch
up, including the purchase of Western and Japanese
technology-intensive firms. Lenovo, for example,
has used the profits derived from its dominance of
the Chinese market to substantially increase its R&D
investments (Xie and White, 2004) and acquire
IBM’s PC division and its two R&D laboratories.
CONCLUSION
Can existing theories of the multinational enterprise
explain the rise of emerging market multinationals
(EMMs)? Because Dunning’s OLI model is the
dominant model of the multinational enterprise in
international business, much of the discussion has
focused on whether it is up to that task or whether it
should be modified. My contention is that the OLI
12 While such pressures go against the rules of the WTO, which
China joined in 2001, firms may still agree to them in order to
get their foot in the door (The Economist, 2011b).
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model is not suited to explain the emergence of
EMMs because of its dichotomy between firm-
specific advantages (FSAs), which are supposed to
allow firms to invest abroad, and country specific
advantages or CSAs, which are properties of the
target country and which determine from which
location the FSA-exploiting firm will serve the target
country. In the OLI model, FSAs, such as technology
and brand names, are seen as necessary and suffi-
cient to successfully compete in foreign markets
because all CSAs, including what I call complemen-
tary local resources, are deemed to be accessible on
the same terms to all firms in a country, whether
local or foreign.
It has increasingly become apparent that this par-
ticular way of looking at the prerequisites for foreign
direct investment cannot explain why EMMs invest
abroad since EMMs possess few of the technologies
and brand names that OLI says are a condition for
foreign direct investment. This has led to consider-
able effort to see whether EMMs may not have yet
undiscovered and unusual types of FSAs that may
make it possible for them to invest abroad (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Guillen and Garcia-Canal,
2009).
At the same time a few scholars, Hennart (2009)
and Ramamurti (2009) for instance, have openly
questioned the OLI assumption that all CSAs are
freely available to all firms in a host country. This
article develops that intuition. It builds on Hennart’s
(2009) bundling model. That model argues that the
profitable sale of any product or service in any given
host market requires the bundling of intangibles such
as technology and brand names with complementary
local resources. These resources include the knowl-
edge of how to incorporate these intangibles into
products that meet the needs and tastes of local con-
sumers, the logistics necessary to put products
within their reach, and all the other inputs necessary
for local production. I argue that, contrary to what
OLI assumes, these complementary local resources
are rarely sold on competitive markets. Especially in
emerging markets, they are often monopolized by
local firms. These firms, especially if, like Lenovo,
they have started their life as distributors (Chen
et al., 2001), often have a better feel than foreign
firms for the needs and tastes of local customers;
they have typically built proprietary distribution net-
works not available to their foreign competitors; they
often enjoy privileged access to natural resources;
they also benefit from better access to local decision
makers. This privileged access to complementary
local resources gives local firms some measure of
market power, which allows them, in some cases, to
(1) obtain free technology from MNEs in exchange
for access to local customers and (2) capture the bulk
of the rents that arise from bundling intangibles with
complementary local resources. Local owners of
complementary resources can then use these rents to
access or acquire technology and reputation. This
process will result in foreign direct investments
whenever the sought-after intangibles are best
accessed by making full or partial acquisitions of
foreign firms and by setting fully or partly owned
greenfield facilities abroad. Armed with these intan-
gibles, these EMMs can successfully compete with
MNEs in their home market and then increasingly
worldwide, as shown, for example, in the case of
Lenovo, Huawei, and Suzlon.
This is only a first pass at a very complex topic. To
simplify the argument, I used the example of a foreign
firm bundling its technology with a local firm’s dis-
tribution services. The model is, however, quite
general. It can be applied, for example, to the bun-
dling of a foreign firm’s technology with a local
entity’s control over mineral deposits. In that case,
cell 2 in Figure 2 corresponds to state-owned compa-
nies (SOCs) of mineral-producing countries extract-
ing minerals with the technical support of developed
country consultants, cell 4 to joint ventures between
SOCs and MNEs, and cell 3 to wholly owned opera-
tions of MNEs. In the oil industry, for example,
MNEs experience high transaction costs accessing oil
and gas deposits because they are usually monopo-
lized by governments and it is difficult to obtain
credible promises not to be held up. At the same time,
there is a competitive market for oil exploration and
production technology. With high transfer costs for
mineral resources and low transfer costs for technol-
ogy, one would expect cell 2 to be the dominant
governance form. And indeed this is the case, with
MNEs (the international oil companies) controlling
less than 10 percent of the world’s oil and gas
resource base and SOCs accounting for an over-
whelming share of world production and reserves
(Jaffe and Soligo, 2007). Since oil and gas reserves
are geographically concentrated and technology is
available from a growing number of companies, one
would also expect SOCs and their governments to
capture the bulk of the profits from oil and gas pro-
duction, a prediction also supported by the empirical
evidence (Bindemann, 1999). The profits garnered by
many of these SOCs have financed their foreign direct
investments (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009).
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What is new about this approach and what does it
suggest for future research? First, it reminds us that
a firm’s possession of intangible-based ownership
advantages, such as superior technology, is not nec-
essary for multinational expansion. A firm expands
abroad when it takes title to the profits that arise
from bundling it own inputs with those of local
owners in a host market, in other words when it
makes these local owners its employees. For this to
happen, its contribution must be more difficult to
measure than that of its local partners. This implies
that multinational expansion can arise from strate-
gies of both intangible exploitation and acquisition.
Multinational expansion also results from strategies
of forward and backward vertical integration, for
example between domestic manufacturing and
foreign distribution and domestic distribution and
foreign manufacturing. These strategies are not
motivated by the exploitation of intangibles and,
hence, this motive is only one of the many that drive
multinational expansion (Hennart, 1982, 2000,
2010).
Second, the bundling model highlights the rather
biased way in which OLI identifies how a firm gains
sustainable competitive advantage. As shown earlier,
OLI proponents tend to highlight the strategic role
played by knowledge-based ownership advantages
and to downplay that of all the other resources
needed to profitably sell a product or service in a
given market. This leads many IB scholars to label
emerging market firms resource poor (Mathews,
2006a) or having competitive disadvantages (Luo
and Tung, 2007) because they do not possess
advanced technology or world-famous brand names.
In contrast, a bundling model encourages us to think
about what it takes to profitably sell a product in a
market. To do so requires finding out what provides
value to customers, orchestrating the efficient deliv-
ery of this value through the use of various
resources, including technology, and capturing a
portion of that value. For this to result in a durable
profit stream also requires some isolating mecha-
nisms to protect the firm against imitation. This
makes clear that the possession of advanced technol-
ogy or strong brand names is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for operating profitably in a
target market. It is not a necessary condition because
technology is just one element of the bundle. In fact,
many firms in both emerging and developed coun-
tries have managed to create and sustain strong
market positions using standard technology to
deliver superior value to customers. Witness Ryanair
in air transport, Netflix in DVD rentals, Zara in
retailing, and Grupo Bimbo in bread and baked
goods. It is not a sufficient condition because having
valuable intangibles does not guarantee success if
the needed local complementary resources cannot be
efficiently accessed. A firm that has developed high
technology products in its home market will not be
successful in a foreign market if it is unable to get the
product into the hands of local customers.
Another important implication of the bundling
model is that the process of value creation and its
apportionment between the cooperating firms is
always context specific. This is because the transac-
tional characteristics of both intangibles and comple-
mentary local assets and the relative bargaining
power of their respective owners are affected by the
economic and institutional context and by the firms
themselves. Which inputs are strategic is likely to
differ across industries. Being able to obtain land in
large parcels is crucial in the hypermarket business
but not in pharmaceuticals, while the effective level
of intellectual property protection is an important
factor for the commercialization of new drugs but
not for setting up hypermarkets. How difficult it is to
transact for these inputs depends, in turn, on the
target country institutional environment. While the
IB literature has started to investigate the impact of a
country’s macro-institutional environment, such as
its political institutions, on the relative ease with
which EMMs and MNEs operate in a given host
country (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008),
more attention needs to be paid to how micro-level
institutions influence the ability of firms to conduct
business and garner rents. Consider, for example, the
impact of intellectual property protection on the
ability of MNEs to exploit their intangibles and fend
off local competition. Technological knowledge, like
any other input, yields supernormal profits only if it
has few substitutes. This is the case when host
country governments grant a legal monopoly to
patent holders and enforce it. Everything else con-
stant, the bargaining power of foreign technology
owners is strongly reduced vis-a-vis local firms if
host countries do not grant or fail to enforce intel-
lectual property rights, as has been the case and is
still the case in many emerging markets (consider,
for example, the role played by the 1970 Indian
Patent Act in the development of a native Indian
pharmaceutical industry). Macro-international
trends are also relevant. As we have seen, the
increased codification, digitization, and modularity
of technology are increasing the number of potential
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technology suppliers and, hence, reducing their bar-
gaining power.
Finally, one of the implications of this article is
that MNEs and EMMs are involved in a race to
access the resources they lack to complete the
bundle. EMMs are seeking to acquire the technology
and brand names they need to compete with MNEs,
while MNEs seek to access the complementary local
factors necessary to exploit their intangibles.
Because the outcome of this race is likely to depend
on the economic and institutional context, we would
expect it to vary across industries and across host
countries. In other words, the relative market share
of local firms and MNEs in emerging markets should
vary across markets and industries. While further
research is needed, a pioneering study by Johansson
and Leigh (2011) provides preliminary support.
There also seems to be significant differences
between firms in their ability to manage access to the
missing parts of the bundle. In the Chinese car indus-
try, for example, the early local entrants that joint
ventured with Western firms have been much slower
in absorbing state-of-the-art technology than later
entrants such as Chery and Geely (Feng, 2010).
Likewise, some MNEs have been much more suc-
cessful than others in accessing complementary local
resources. Compare, for example, the performance
of Nokia and Motorola, and Carrefour and Wal-Mart
in China. A key factor in Nokia’s better performance
seems to have been its willingness to invest in dis-
tribution (Ryans, 2010), which is consistent with my
argument. Clearly much more research is needed on
this issue.
The strategic importance of complementary local
assets I have highlighted undoubtedly varies across
countries and industries and is affected by host
country government policies and firm capabilities.
More work is needed to verify that the model applies
across all emerging markets. Nonetheless, I hope
that by presenting a model of the interaction between
MNEs and local firms in emerging markets that
explicitly recognizes the role played by complemen-
tary local resources, I will stimulate further research
on their strategic importance so we can gain a better
understanding of the dynamics of the competition
between EMMs and MNEs.
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